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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature'of the Case 
Abigail Swindle appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional 
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, challenging the denial of her 
motion to suppress 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas 
The state charged Swindle with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.63-64.) Swindle filed a motion to 
suppress, claiming her detention was illegal because, she asserted, "[alt the time 
she was ordered detained the police had no basis for a suspicion that [she] was 
involved in criminal activity." (R., p.74.) The district court found the following 
facts after an evidentiary hearing: 
On March 3, 2007, [Swindle] was a visitor at a mobile home 
owned by Kristine Bear in Post Falls, Idaho. That day Kootenai 
County Sheriff's Deputies Patrick Meehan and Charles Sciortino, 
acting on separate tips by two identified neighbors that drug 
activities were occurring in the mobile home, went to that home and 
were invited in by Kristine Bear. The deputies explained why they 
were there, and Ms. Bear gave her consent for the deputies to look 
around. Deputy Sciortino asked if there were other people in the 
residence, and Bear said there was one other person in the back 
room. 
Deputy Sciortino went to the back bedroom where he saw 
[Swindle]. He asked [Swindle] if there was anyone else in the 
residence, and she replied that there was not. Deputy Sciortino 
brought the defendant toward the living room, and in doing so 
discovered a woman hiding in another bedroom. This other woman 
gave Deputy Sciortino what turned out to be a false name and had 
a warrant out for her arrest. The deputy took both the defendant 
and the other woman to the living room where Deputy Meehan, Ms. 
Bear, and her minor son were located. Deputy Sciortino then 
received verbal consent from Ms. Bear to search the residence for 
drugs. While in the living room, the defendant asked to go into the 
bathroom to get a band-aid for her finger. Deputy Sciortino saw 
that she already had a bandage on the indicated finger. Deputy 
Sciortino denied this request and said to wait a few minutes as they 
would be done soon. 
While Deputy Sciortino searched the residene, Deputy 
Meehan asked for the identification of al the occupants of the 
house; Deputy Meehan could not recall if he returned [Swindle's] 
identification. Deputy Sciortino found a bindle of what is alleged to 
be methamphetamine in the bathroom; this bindle appeared to 
have been recently used to ingest suspected drugs. Deputy 
Sciortino returned to the living room where he advised everyone 
present of their Miranda rights. All of the individuals indicated they 
understood their rights. 
Deputy Sciortino told all assembled about finding the bindle 
in the bathroom, and asked to whom it belonged. All answered to 
the effect, "Not me." Deputy Sciortino then said that somebody was 
going to admit to the bindle or everybody was going to be going to 
jail. He also advised that somebody should be honest and admit 
the bindle belonged to that person. He further advised that at jail 
he would be performing drug test on the arrested persons, but all 
could be avoided if someone is honest; otherwise, everyone will go 
(to jail). 
At that point [Swindle] said, "I'll take it. It doesn't matter. I'm 
not letting her (presumably Ms. Bear) with kids go to jail." Deputy 
Sciortino admonished [Swindle] a few times not to make a false 
admission, but [Swindle] persisted that she would take 
responsibility for the bindle. 
[Swindle] admitted last using methamphetamine about a 
week prior, and was then arrested. A search incident to arrest 
revealed methamphetamine and seven pipes in her pockets and in 
her bra. 
(R., pp.108-110.) 
Based on these facts, and the applicable law, the district court determined 
Swindle's detention was reasonable and she was not entitled to suppression. 
( R  pp.112-15.) Swindle thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the court's order 
denying her motion to suppress, and the state dismissed the possession of 
paraphernalia charge. (R., pp.118, 122-23 ) The court imposed a unified four- 
year sentence with two years fixed but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.134-36.) 
Swindle appealed. (R., pp.138-40.) 
Swindle states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Swindle's motion to 
suppress her statements made and evidence seized because she 
was unlawfully detained? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as follows: 
Did the district court correctly apply the law to the facts in denying 
Swindle's motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Denvincl Swindle's 
Motion To Suwpress 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Swindle's suppression motion, ruling there was 
reasonable articulable suspicion to support the detention. (R., pp.114-15.) 
Swindle challenges the district court's ruling, claiming the officers lacked 
"individualized, particularized suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity" 
and that her statements and the evidence discovered following the search 
incident to her arrest should be suppressed as "fruit" of her allegedly unlawful 
detention. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-18.) Swindle's arguments fail, however, 
because application of the correct legal principles to the facts of this case support 
the district court's determination that the detention was constitutionally 
reasonable. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court defers to 
the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
The district court's legal determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been met is subject to free review. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 916 
P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
Swindle's Detention Was Constitutionallv Reasonable 
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 
(1981). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must 
be supported by probable cause. a at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement. For example, it is well-settled that a police officer may, in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
underway. Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). 
Swindle argues that because she believes the deputies lacked 
individualized suspicion to detain her, "her statements that the bindle belonged to 
her, as well as any other statements made during this time, should be 
suppressed." (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-17.) Swindle further argues "her arrest, 
and the statements made during her arrest and subsequent search directly 
resulted from her statement that the bindle belonged to her and should have 
been suppressed as fruit of her illegal detention." (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) 
Swindle's arguments fail. 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must 
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person . . . [Tlhe evidence . . . must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 ldaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her 
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience 
and law enforcement training."); State v. Mvers, 118 ldaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 
I 
I 
I 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990) ("An officer's training and experience often play a role in 
I 
pinpointing facts and circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion of 
I 
criminal activity afoot."). 
I 
Here, the deputies had information from "two identified neighbors that drug 
I 
activities were occurring in [Ms. Bear's] mobile home."' (R., p.108.) Based on 
this information, the deputies went to Ms. Bear's home, and it is undisputed that, 
Deputies Sciortino and Meehan entered Ms. Bear's home with her consent, and 
that Ms. Bear gave consent to the deputies to "look around." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
I 
p.13, Ls.1-16.) Deputy Sciortino originally walked through Ms. Bear's home to 
find the other individual Ms. Bear reported was there, at which time he found 
' Swindle argues that the generalized information provided by the citizens that 
formed the basis for their belief of drug activity was not "specific enough to 
provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" at Ms. Bear's house. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This argument was not, however, a basis for Swindle's 
motion to suppress (R., pp.74-75); accordingly, it cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Fodae, 121 ldaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 
(1 992) (Issues not raised before the trial court generally cannot be considered for 
the first time on appeal.). Moreover, Swindle is incorrect that an officer cannot, 
based upon his training experience, form a reasonable articulable suspicion of 
drug activity based upon the information provided to the deputies in this case. 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.45, Ls.3-I4 (Deputy ScSciortino describing the information 
provided to him and his belief, based on that information, "that the persons within 
[Ms. Bear's] trailer were either using, selling, or possessing illegal drugs.")). 
Swindle in one of the bedrooms. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.34, Ls.10-13.) Deputy 
Sciortino asked Swindle if there was anyone else there, to which she replied, 
"No." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.34, Ls.15-18.) That turned out to be untrue as Deputy 
Sciortino shortly thereafter found another individual hiding "behind a sheet that 
was covering the doorway." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.lO.) Based on 
the information of reported drug activity related to Ms. Bear's home, Swindle's 
presence there, and her attempt to conceal the presence of another individual, 
Deputies Sciortino and Meehan had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain 
her during their investigation. State v. DuValt, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 
641, 644 (1998) (defendant's presence at house suspected of drug activity gave 
rise to a reasonable inference that defendant was involved with the illegal 
activity); see also State v. Zapp, 108 ldaho 723, 701 P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(noting an "officers' suspicions reasonably were aroused" when individual arrived 
at home being searched and responded to inquiries regarding his identity that 
"lacked the ring of truth" and concluding the officers were "entitled, at that point 
briefly to detain [the individuau, preserving the status quo while they determined 
his true identity and ascertained whether any warrants were outstanding.")). 
Even if this Court concludes Swindle's detention was unlawful, the 
evidence she seeks to suppress is not, as she claims, "fruit" of that detention. 
Evidence or information acquired as a result of a constitutionally impermissible 
seizure will not be excluded if the causal connection between the seizure and the 
acquisition has been broken. Wona Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963). As explained by the Supreme Court in Wonq Sun: 
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal 
actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case 
is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the 
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 
Id. as quoted by State v. Bainbridge, 117 ldaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 -
In order "[tlo determine whether to suppress evidence as 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree,' the court must inquire whether the evidence has been recovered 
as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." State v. Page, 140 ldaho 841, 
846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004) (citing United States v. Green, 11 1 F.3d 515, 520 
(7th Cir. 1997)). "There are three factors for a court to consider when determining 
whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated:" (1) the amount of 
time that has elapsed "between the misconduct and the acquisition of the 
evidence;" (2) whether there were intervening circumstances; and (3) "the 
flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action." m, 740 ldaho 
at 846, 103 P.3d at 459. Not all of these factors must be resolved in favor of the 
state. State v. Schrecennost, 134 ldaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 
2000). "The test only requires a balancing of the relative weights of all the 
factors, viewed together, in order to determine if the police exploited an illegality 
to discover evidence." Id- (citing United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549- 
550 (4th Cir. 1998). Application of this three-factor test to the facts of this case 
reveals the district court correctly concluded Swindle was not entitled to 
suppression. 
The discovery of the methamphetamine that resulted in Swindle's 
admission to possessing methamphetamine and her subsequent arrest and the 
ultimate discovery of additional methamphetamine and paraphernalia on her 
person was not the result of Swindle's detention. Rather the methamphetamine 
the deputies discovered that caused them to inquire into its ownership was 
recovered pursuant to Ms. Bear's consent to search her home. Once the 
deputies discovered the methamphetamine, they, unquestionably, had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Swindle to determine whether she had 
knowledge of the presence of drugs at Ms. Bear's home. See I.C. § 37-2732(d) 
(it is a misdemeanor "for any person to be present at or on the premises of any 
place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or 
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, 
administration, use, or to be given away"). Thus, even assuming Swindle's initial 
detention was unlawful, her admission that she possessed methamphetamine 
and the resulting arrest and search were not fruit of that detention. 
Because there was a reasonable articulable basis for detaining Swindle 
and because even absent a valid basis for her detention, the evidence she seeks 
to suppress was the result of a valid consensual search of Ms. Bear's home, 
Swindle has failed to establish error in the denial of her motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Swindle's conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. 
DATED this loth day of October, 2008, 
I 1 -  
A M. LORELLO 
ttorney Genera! 
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